Identity · Threat Intelligence
SilentAir hackers intercepted texts and calls by hijacking mobile networks
A group called SilentAir used hacked equipment inside Asian telecoms to intercept calls and SMS, mainly targeting people in Taiwan. Security researchers say the attackers went after two-factor authentication codes and VIPs.
Ross Grant3 min read

The short version
A group of hackers called SilentAir broke into mobile phone networks in Asia and secretly intercepted calls and text messages, especially in Taiwan. They were able to steal two-factor authentication codes sent by SMS, which are often used to protect online accounts. The attackers mainly targeted important people, like politicians. Security experts say this shows why SMS codes are not always safe for protecting accounts.
What happened?
A group called SilentAir used hacked equipment inside Asian mobile networks to intercept calls and SMS messages, mainly targeting people in Taiwan. Security researchers at Enea found that the attackers diverted texts, including two-factor authentication codes, and monitored VIPs. The attacks were detected in at least six countries, and Enea says the group is likely a state-level actor. The company has notified the affected operators.
Who is affected
According to research by Enea, a telecom security company, the group named SilentAir targeted mobile subscribers in at least six Asian countries, with most victims in Taiwan. The attackers also targeted people in other Southeast and East Asian countries, and less frequently in East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Some of the targets were political and government VIPs in their own countries. The exact names of the affected operators, countries, or individuals have not been published. In rare cases, equipment in several countries worked together against a single target, suggesting a coordinated campaign.
How the attack worked
SilentAir compromised equipment inside mobile operator networks. They used this access to send special network messages (UpdateLocation in SS7 or its Diameter equivalent) that told the target's home network that the hacked equipment was now serving the target's phone. If accepted, this diverted the target's calls and texts to the attackers. This technique allowed SilentAir to intercept SMS messages, including two-factor authentication (2FA) codes, immediately after the diversion. The company did not confirm whether any accounts were taken over as a result. Some attacks also allowed the group to track the locations of targets, though this was a smaller part of their activity.
The attackers sent large numbers of silent SMS messages, texts that do not alert the phone user. Most of these were sent to Taiwanese subscribers, often at night. The messages sometimes contained spam-like content in English, likely as a disguise in case the message was displayed. These silent SMS were used to check if diversions were still working, as the attackers could confirm interception if the message reached their own equipment instead of the target's phone.
Who is behind it
Enea assessed with high confidence that SilentAir is a state-level actor. The company linked the activity to China with low confidence, based on the focus on Taiwan, the lack of Chinese targets, and the timing of attacks matching a workday in China’s time zone. However, there is no direct evidence confirming Chinese involvement. The group’s technical skills and operational security were described as advanced. SilentAir’s behaviour partly overlaps with another group, Liminal Panda, but the connection is unconfirmed.
The response
Enea notified the affected operators where it found SilentAir activity. The company said SilentAir’s operations have been disrupted for now, but the group could return. It is not clear whether the operators have fully removed the compromised equipment. Enea could not analyse the malware used by SilentAir, but found traces of unauthorised access after containing the attacks.
What you should do
For individuals, this attack highlights the risks of relying on SMS for two-factor authentication. Security professionals recommend using app-based authentication or hardware security keys where possible. Mobile operators should review their network security controls, monitor for unusual signalling traffic, and consider stronger defences for SS7 and Diameter protocols.
Why it matters
This attack shows that even core mobile networks can be compromised to intercept private calls and texts. It highlights the risks of using SMS for authentication and the need for stronger defences in telecom infrastructure.
Key points
- SilentAir used hacked telecom equipment to intercept calls and SMS in Asia.
- Most targets were in Taiwan, including political and government figures.
- Attackers stole two-factor authentication codes sent by SMS.
- Enea says SilentAir is likely a state-level actor, possibly linked to China.
- Experts recommend using app-based or hardware authentication instead of SMS.
Sources
The Hacker News
Reference
SecurityWeek
Reference



