Vulnerabilities · Cloud Security · Threat Intelligence
Hackers used Qubole’s AWS access to steal customer cloud data
Attackers broke into multiple AWS accounts by abusing Qubole’s trusted access, stealing secrets and data. Customers with old Qubole integrations may still be at risk.
Ross GrantUpdated 3 min read
The short version
Hackers broke into cloud accounts belonging to companies that used Qubole, a data platform. They did this by abusing the trusted access Qubole had to its customers’ AWS accounts. The attackers stole passwords, keys, and large amounts of data. Companies with old Qubole connections to AWS could still be at risk if they have not removed or restricted those permissions.
By the numbers
- tenscompanies affectedBleepingComputer
- millionsfiles stolen from one customerBleepingComputer
- 100passwords and keys stolen in seven minutesBleepingComputer
What happened?
Hackers used credentials for Qubole’s AWS account to access multiple customer AWS environments between 14 and 26 October 2026. They assumed trusted roles, stole secrets and downloaded data, including millions of files from at least one company. The method used to obtain Qubole’s credentials is not known. Qubole and its parent company have not commented publicly.
Who is affected
The attack targeted companies that had integrated Qubole, a cloud data platform, with their AWS environments. Any organisation that set up an AWS IAM (Identity and Access Management) role to trust Qubole’s AWS account could be affected, even if they no longer use Qubole. According to BleepingComputer (opens in a new tab), the campaign affected “tens of companies”. Security firm Sentra confirmed that millions of files were stolen from at least one customer.
How the attack worked
Researchers at Wiz and Sentra found that attackers obtained credentials for Qubole’s AWS account, which is trusted by customer AWS roles. The attackers used these credentials to assume roles in customer accounts between 14 and 26 October 2026. The method used to steal Qubole’s credentials is not known. Once inside, the attackers:
- Assumed unused roles that still trusted Qubole’s account.
- Used AWS’s AssumeRole API with the correct External ID (a code required for cross-account access).
- Searched for secrets in AWS Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, and Lambda environment variables.
- Validated credentials using TruffleHog, a tool for finding and testing secrets.
- Downloaded all accessible data from S3 buckets, sometimes copying entire buckets at once.
The attackers moved quickly. Sentra reported that they collected about 100 passwords and keys in just seven minutes. The activity was first spotted by Sentra in several customer environments and then reported to Wiz for further investigation. The Hacker News (opens in a new tab) notes that most roles abused were unused but still trusted Qubole, making them easy targets.
What was taken
The attackers stole secrets and data from affected AWS accounts. This included AWS access keys, Microsoft Entra ID client secrets, Okta client credentials, and data stored in S3 buckets. In at least one case, millions of files were taken from a single customer. The attackers did not target specific files but downloaded whatever the compromised roles could access.
The response
Neither Qubole nor its parent company Idera had posted a public statement about the breach at the time of reporting. AWS told BleepingComputer that its own services were not compromised and recommended customers review cross-account roles, remove unused integrations, and restrict permissions using least-privilege principles and source IP conditions. Wiz and Sentra advised all organisations with Qubole integrations (past or present) to check CloudTrail logs from 1 October 2026 for suspicious AssumeRole activity from Qubole’s AWS account (ID 805246085872), especially from non-AWS IP addresses. They also recommend rotating all credentials that could have been accessed, revoking active sessions, and removing or restricting Qubole roles.
What you should do
- Review and remove any unused Qubole IAM roles in your AWS accounts.
- Add source IP restrictions to trusted roles to limit access to known Qubole network ranges.
- Rotate all secrets and credentials that could have been accessed by Qubole roles.
- Enable detailed S3 logging to track which files are accessed in the future.
- Regularly audit third-party integrations and follow least-privilege principles for permissions.
No one has said how the attackers first got Qubole’s credentials, and the total number of affected companies is not confirmed.
Claimed vs confirmed
- Confirmed
Millions of files were stolen from one customer.
Sentra confirmed millions of files were taken from at least one victim.
- Denied
AWS services themselves were compromised.
AWS stated its own services were not compromised and operated as designed.
Why it matters
This attack shows how trusted third-party access can be abused if not properly managed, even after a service is no longer used. It highlights the need for regular audits of cloud permissions and third-party integrations to prevent similar breaches.
Key points
- Attackers abused Qubole’s trusted AWS access to breach customer accounts.
- Secrets and millions of files were stolen from affected companies.
- Most abused roles were unused but still trusted Qubole’s AWS account.
- No public statement from Qubole or Idera at the time of reporting.
- Regular audits and least-privilege permissions can reduce this risk.
Sources
The Hacker News
Reference
BleepingComputer
Reference




